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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consumer welfare is the common concern of the antitrust laws and the Texas 
Deceptive Trade Practices—Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).1 Antitrust, 
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 1. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 et seq. (West 2011 & Supp. 2013). Section 
17.50 of the DTPA provides:  
A consumer may maintain an action where any of the following constitute a 
producing cause of economic damages or damages for mental anguish: 
(1) the use or employment by any person of a false, misleading, or deceptive 
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however, primarily addresses the misuse of market power used to harm 
consumers, while the DTPA focuses on consumer harm brought about through 
deception.2 The antitrust laws and the DTPA therefore are best viewed as 
focusing on complementary aspects of consumer welfare. 
This Article covers significant developments under the federal and Texas 
antitrust laws and the DTPA during the survey period, November 1, 2012 
through October 31, 2013.3 
II.  ANTITRUST 
Texas courts were quiet on antitrust issues during the Survey period. The 
decisions from the United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts in 
Texas that addressed antitrust claims are discussed below. 
A.  ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
The United States Supreme Court considered the antitrust ramifications of 
reverse payment settlement of patent infringement claims in F.T.C. v. Actavis, 
Inc.4 The Federal Trade Commission had sued several settling parties, 
challenging the legality of the form of patent settlement known as “reverse 
payment,” in which the alleged infringer agrees not to produce the patented 
product during the patent’s term in exchange for a large payment from the 
holder of the patent.5 
The district court dismissed the FTC’s claims and the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed, holding that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a 
reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long as its 
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the 
patent.”6 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that antitrust 
legality should be measured both against patent law policy and against 
procompetitive antitrust policy.7 
The Court concluded that reverse payment settlements can “sometimes” 
result in antitrust violations.8 The Court first observed that an agreement that 
 
act or practice that is: (A) specifically enumerated in a subdivision of 
Subsection (b) of Section 17.46 of this subchapter; and (B) relied on by a 
consumer to the consumer’s detriment;  
(2) breach of an express or implied warranty;  
(3) any unconscionable action or course of action by any person; or  
(4) the use or employment by any person of an act or practice in violation of 
Chapter 541, Insurance Code. 
 2. Id. § 14.44(a); Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. 
Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 3. Because this article was not published last year, the authors have also included select 
opinions from the twelve months preceding the Survey Period. 
 4. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
 5. Id. at 2225. 
 6. FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312, 1315 (2012), rev’d sub nom. Actavis, 
1333 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 7. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235–36. 
 8. Id. at 2234. 
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the claimed infringer would not attempt to enter the market for a specified 
period of time had the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”9 
Additionally, while any settlement could reflect the parties’ evaluation of 
avoided litigation costs or other competition neutral valuations, there is also the 
potential for anticompetitive consequences that are not justified by such 
considerations.10 The Court next observed that there was evidence in the record 
“showing that reverse payment agreements are associated with the presence of 
higher-than-competitive profits—a strong indication of market power.”11 
The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s concern that antitrust scrutiny of a 
reverse payment settlement would require determination of the underlying 
patent validity or infringement case.12 Finally, the Court stated that even though 
a “large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability,” the parties could 
settle their lawsuit on different terms.13 
The Court declined to hold that reverse payment settlement agreements are 
presumptively unlawful and thus could be evaluated using the “quick look” 
approach, rather than the rule of reason.14 Because 
the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive effects 
depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future 
litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might 
represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification [and 
the] existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence may . . . vary 
as among industries . . . the FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-
reason cases.15 
B.  ANTITRUST AND CLASS ACTION ARBITRATION WAIVERS 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,16 the Supreme Court upheld the use of 
contractual class action arbitration waivers, even where the amount of individual 
damages made individual arbitration unfeasible. In American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant,17 the Court considered whether anything about antitrust 
claims or federal statutory claims generally required a different result. 
The merchant plaintiffs brought a putative class action against American 
Express, claiming that AMEX had “used its monopoly power in the market for 
charge cards to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately 
30% higher than the fees for competing credit cards.”18 The contract at issue 
contained an arbitration clause that precluded class arbitration, which the 
plaintiffs attempted to avoid on the ground that “requiring them to litigate their 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 2235–36 
 11. Id. at 2236. 
 12. Id. at 2234. 
 13. Id. at 2237. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752–53 (2011). 
 17. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013). 
 18. Id. at 2308. 
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claims individually . . . would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws.”19 
The Supreme Court rejected the argument. The Court agreed that in some 
ways, such as the enactment of treble damages provisions, Congress had evinced 
a willingness to exceed normal limits to advance “its goals of deterring and 
remedying unlawful trade practices.”20 However, nothing in the Sherman Act or 
Clayton Act guarantees an affordable avenue for vindicating antitrust rights and 
neither statute demonstrates an intention to preclude class action waivers.21 
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ appeal to the judge-made exception to 
the FAA that “allow[s] courts to invalidate agreements that prevent the ‘effective 
vindication’ of a federal statutory right.”22 The plaintiffs argued only that they 
had “no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust claims individually in 
arbitration.”23 “But the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a 
statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that 
remedy.”24 
C.  THE STATE ACTION IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
In F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court considered 
the applicability of the state action doctrine to actions of a special purpose 
public entity. A county hospital authority in Georgia owned a hospital and 
decided to purchase the only other hospital in the county.26 The Federal Trade 
Commission challenged the acquisition and the county argued that it was 
entitled to state action immunity from the antitrust laws.27 
Under Parker v. Brown,28 state governments are entitled to immunity from 
antitrust scrutiny when they impose market restraints. In an effort to balance 
state action immunity with “the fundamental national values of free enterprise 
and economic competition that are embodied in the federal antitrust laws,” 
municipalities and other substate governmental entities are entitled to state 
action immunity when they act “pursuant to a clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition.”29 Authority to act is 
not sufficient.30 The “governmental entity must also show that it has been 
delegated authority to act or regulate anticompetitively.”31 
The Court reviewed the enabling legislation and concluded that the Georgia 
 
 19. Id. at 2309. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. The Court acknowledged that both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act predated the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowing for class action practice. Id. The Court held that 
congressional approval of those rules failed to “establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the 
vindication of statutory rights.” Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 2311 (emphasis in original). 
 25. F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1007 (2013). 
 26. Id. at 1005. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (1943). 
 29. Phoebe, 133 S. Ct. at 1007, 1010. 
 30. Id. at 1012. 
 31. Id. at 1013. 
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legislature had not expressly adopted a policy to permit hospitals to make 
acquisitions that could substantially lessen competition.32 It therefore concluded 
that state action immunity did not apply.33 
D.  THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE ANTITRUST LAWS 
American Airlines, Inc. v. Sabre, Inc.34 arose from a dispute between American 
Airlines and Sabre, a commercial reservations system with which American had 
contracted. After making technology improvements that enabled American to 
sell its services directly to consumers, American alleged that the owners and 
operators of Sabre engaged in anticompetitive conduct and other violations of 
the Sherman Act.35 American sued Sabre in federal court in the Northern 
District of Texas, raising federal antitrust claims, and sued Sabre in the 67th 
Texas Judicial District Court in Tarrant County for monopolization in violation 
of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 (TFEAA).36 
Sabre removed the state court case to federal court.37 The district court 
granted American’s motion to remand and awarded American $15,955 in 
attorneys’ fees on the ground that the removal was objectively unreasonable.38 
Sabre appealed. Relying on Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering 
& Manufacturing,39 Sabre argued that American’s TFEAA claim necessarily raised 
a federal issue because TFEAA is to be construed “in harmony with federal 
judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes.”40 The Fifth 
Circuit determined that “nothing in the plain language of the TFEAA or Texas 
case law interpreting the TFEAA requires that federal law control Texas’ 
interpretation of its state antitrust statute.”41 Because Sabre failed to 
demonstrate that American’s state law claim necessarily raised an issue of federal 
law, and deferring to the discretion vested in district courts when assessing 
attorneys’ fees, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s fee award.42 
III.  DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES—CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
Noteworthy DTPA decisions during the Survey Period examined 
misrepresentations, the professional services exemption, limitations, jury 
questions, and remedies. 
A.  MISREPRESENTATIONS 
Section 17.50(a)(1) of the DTPA provides a cause of action for consumers 
 
 32. Id. at 1015. 
 33. Id. at 1011. 
 34. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Sabre, Inc., 694 F.3d 539, 540 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 35. Id. at 541. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 40. Am. Airlines, 694 F. 3d at 542. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 544. 
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harmed by certain categories of misrepresentations enumerated in DTPA section 
17.46(b).43 In Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Jolly,44 the Houston Court of Appeals 
considered whether the evidence admitted at trial was legally sufficient to 
support the jury’s verdict against Red Roof Inns. 
Donna Jolly and James Glick (the Guests) rented a motel room in Houston at 
2:30 a.m., at which time they received a room key card and observed an on-duty 
security guard.45 Discussions between motel staff and the Guests were limited. 
The Guests confirmed vacancy, booked their motel room, and determined they 
could not use the motel’s safe.46 The Guests alleged that during their stay, 
someone stole $50,000 in jewelry from their motel room.47 
The Guests sued, alleging in part that Red Roof Inns violated the DTPA by 
making actionable misrepresentations.48 The jury found Red Roof Inns engaged 
in false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices that the Guests relied on to 
their detriment and that were a producing cause of the Guests’ damages.49 In 
particular, the jury found that Red Roof Inns violated sections 17.46(b)(7) and 
(24) of the DTPA.50 
On appeal, in a case of first impression, the court considered whether an 
implied misrepresentation was actionable under section 17.46(b)(7).51 Under 
section 17.46(b)(7), a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice includes 
representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, 
or that goods are of a particular style or model, when they are of another.52 To 
set a legal standard for determining whether a misrepresentation may be implied 
under the DTPA, the court of appeals looked to the law of implied covenants.53 
The court concluded that a representation should be implied from conduct 
“only when, under the circumstances at the time the party engaged in that 
conduct, the only reasonable interpretation of that conduct is that the party 
meant to convey the representation in question.”54 
Using that standard, the court identified several reasonable interpretations of 
the motel’s conduct with respect to giving a room key card and for having a 
security guard on duty.55 The court held that therefore, neither act would enable 
reasonable and fair-minded people to find that Red Roof Inns represented its 
goods or services to be of a particular standard, quality, or grade (i.e., that the 
Guests’ room could not be accessed by motel employees or that the hotel was 
secure) when they were of another.56 
 
 43. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(1) (West 2011). 
 44. Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Jolly, 2011 Tex. App. 2011 WL 6288147 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2011, no pet. h.). 
 45. Id. at *1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at *2–3. 
 52. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(7) (West 2002). 
 53. Red Roof, 2011 WL 6288147 at *3. 
 54. Id. at *4. 
 55. Id. at *4–6. 
 56. Id. at *7. 
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The court then analyzed the jury’s verdict as to claims brought under section 
17.46(b)(24). Under section 17.46(b)(24), a false, misleading, or deceptive act or 
practice includes failing to disclose information concerning goods or services, 
which was known at the time of the transaction, if the failure to disclose such 
information was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which 
the consumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed.57 
The Guests listed six categories of undisclosed information, including 152 
service calls to the motel by local law enforcement in the preceding two years, 
instances of inaccurate room key card reporting, which prevented accurate 
tracking of who entered a motel room, and security camera deficiencies.58 Red 
Roof Inns disputed whether motel agents transacting with the Guests had 
knowledge of such information. The court of appeals held that even if those 
agents knew of the information when transacting with the Guests, there was no 
evidence that Red Roof Inns intentionally withheld the information with the 
intent of inducing the Guests to rent a hotel room.59 Ultimately, the court held 
that that there must be direct evidence of the intent to induce under this 
subsection of the DTPA.60 The court rejected the Guests’ request that the court 
adopt the legal rule followed in Jones v. Ray Insurance Agency,61 in which the 
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals had held that “in the absence of direct 
evidence of intent to induce, intent may be presumed if the undisclosed 
information” is material and known to the defendant.62 
In Texas Real Estate Commission v. Asgari,63 the San Antonio court of appeals 
considered whether purchasers of a commercial lot may recover from the Texas 
Real Estate Recovery Trust Account based on a licensed real estate broker’s 
alleged misrepresentations under the DTPA.64 The real estate broker, who was 
licensed by the Texas Real Estate Commission, represented to the purchasers of 
a commercial “lot that they needed only to rezone the property for it to be 
suitable” for use as a used car lot.65 This representation was false as the property 
also needed to be platted and removed from flood plain status.66 
The purchasers sued the real estate broker for representing that the property 
(1) had characteristics, uses and benefits which it did not have, and (2) “was of a 
particular standard and quality when in fact it was of another.”67 The county 
court at law found in favor of the purchasers. The purchasers, who were 
 
 57. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(24). 
 58. Red Roof, 2011 WL 6288147 at *7. 
 59. Id. at *9. 
 60. See id. at *8–9. 
 61. Jones v. Ray Ins. Agency, 59 S.W.3d 739, 750 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001), pet. 
denied, 92 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. 2002) (per curium). 
 62. Red Roof, 2011 WL 6288147 at *8–9. 
 63. Tex. Real Estate Comm’n v. Asgari, 402 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no 
pet.). 
 64. Section 1101.601(a) of the Texas Occupations Code provides that the Texas Real Estate 
Commission shall maintain a real estate recovery trust account to reimburse aggrieved persons who 
suffer actual damages caused by an act described by section 1101.602 of that Code committed by a 
license holder. 
 65. Tex. Real Estate, 402 S.W.3d at 815. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.46(b)(5) and (7). 
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ultimately unable to collect from the real estate broker, requested payment from 
the Texas Real Estate Recovery Trust Account.68 
The Commission objected that payment from the Texas Real Estate Recovery 
Trust Account could only be had upon a finding of fraud, misrepresentation, or 
dishonesty.69 Thereafter, the trial court clarified its judgment, finding liability 
based on the real estate broker’s violations of sections 17.46(b)(5) and (7) of the 
DTPA. The Trust Account appealed the trial court’s order mandating payment, 
claiming the evidence was legally insufficient to support the judgment.70 The 
court of appeals held that “the evidence [was] legally sufficient for a reasonable 
fact finder to determine that [the real estate broker] engaged in 
misrepresentations.”71 That the real estate broker did not know that his 
representations regarding the property were false was irrelevant; the DTPA does 
not require proof of knowing or intentional conduct.72 
B.  PROFESSIONAL SERVICES EXEMPTION 
In Retherford v. Castro,73 the Waco Court of Appeals examined the scope and 
applicability of the DTPA professional services exemption.74 Retherford was a 
home inspector licensed by the Texas Real Estate Commission.75 The Castros 
hired Retherford to inspect a home they had contracted to buy.76 When the 
home’s roof leaked within a year of its purchase, the Castros hired a second 
inspector who opined that Retherford would have discovered the leaky roof had 
he possessed the necessary knowledge and experience.77 The Castros then sued 
Retherford alleging he misrepresented that his services had characteristics, uses, 
benefits, and a standard of quality they did not have.78 Retherford pled that the 
DTPA’s professional services exemption in section 17.49(c) insulated him from 
 
 68. See TEX. OCC. CODE § 1101.652(a)(3). 
 69. Id.; see TEX. OCC. CODE § 1101.652(a)(3). “The commission may suspend or revoke a 
license issued under this chapter or take other disciplinary action authorized by this chapter if the 
license holder . . . engages in misrepresentation, dishonesty, or fraud when selling, buying, trading, 
or leasing real property in the name of . . . the license holder.” 
 70. Section 1101.608(c) of the Texas Occupations Code allows the Texas Real Estate 
Commission to re-litigate any material and relevant issue that resulted in the judgment in favor of 
the aggrieved person. 
 71. Tex. Real Estate, 402 S.W.3d at 819. 
 72. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(1). 
 73. Retherford v. Castro, 378 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. denied). 
 74. Section 17.49(c) of the DTPA provides, “Nothing in this subchapter shall apply to a claim 
for damages based on the rendering of a professional service, the essence of which is the providing 
of advice, judgment, opinion, or similar professional skill. This exemption does not apply to: 
(1) an express misrepresentation of a material fact that cannot be characterized as advice, 
judgment, or opinion; 
(2) a failure to disclose information in violation of Section 17.46(b)(24); 
(3) an unconscionable action or course of action that cannot be characterized as advice, 
judgment, or opinion; 
(4) breach of an express warranty that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment, or 
opinion; or 
(5) a violation of Section 17.46(b)(26). 
 75. Retherford, 378 S.W.3d at 31. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 32. 
 78. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5), (7) (West 2011). 
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any alleged liability.79 Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the 
professional services exemption did not apply.80 Retherford appealed. 
The court of appeals began its analysis by observing that the professional 
services exemption does not define the “professions” covered by the 
exemption.81 While the DTPA was amended in 2011 to exclude specific real 
estate professionals listed in Chapter 1101 of the Texas Occupations Code from 
DTPA liability, licensed professional home inspectors were not included in that 
separate exclusion.82 Looking to the Eastland Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Duncanville Diagnostic Center, Inc. v. Atlantic Lloyd’s Insurance Company,83 the court 
of appeals held that the definition of a professional is one who (1) “engages in 
work involving mental or intellectual rather than physical labor; (2) requires 
special education to be used on behalf of others; and (3) earns profits dependent 
mainly on these considerations.”84 The court of appeals concluded that a 
professional real estate inspector is a professional under this definition.85 
Because Retherford’s inspection report included Retherford’s professional 
opinion, the conduct complained of involved Retherford’s services, the essence 
of which was providing advice, judgment or an opinion.86 Therefore, the court 
the court of appeals concluded that the professional services exemption 
applied.87 The court of appeals also concluded that the exception to the 
professional services exemption provided in section 17.49(c)(1) did not apply.88 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on the Castros’ 
remaining claims.89 
C.  STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The statute of limitations for a DTPA claim, with certain exceptions, is two 
years.90 In both Gonzales v. Southwest Olshan Foundation Repair Company, LLC91 
 
 79. Retherford, 378 S.W.3d at 33. 
 80. Id. at 32. 
 81. Id. at 33. 
 82. See id. at 34–35. 
 83. Duncanville Diagnostic Ctr., Inc. v. Atl. Lloyd’s Ins. Co., 875 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tex. 
App.—Eastland 1994, writ denied). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Retherford, 378 S.W.3d at 36. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. The professional services exception does not apply to an express misrepresentation of a 
material fact that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment, or opinion. TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 17.49(c)(1) (West 2011). 
 89. Retherford, 378 S.W.3d at 38. 
 90. “All actions brought under this subchapter must be commenced within two years after the 
date on which the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after 
the consumer discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
occurrence of the false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice. The period of limitation provided 
in this section may be extended for a period of 180 days if the plaintiff proves that failure timely to 
commence the action was caused by the defendant’s knowingly engaging in conduct solely 
calculated to induce the plaintiff to refrain from or postpone the commencement of the action.” 
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.565 (West 2011). 
 91. Gonzales v. Sw. Olshan Found. Repair Co., LLC, 400 S.W.3d 52, 54–55 (Tex. 2013). 
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and Design Tech Homes, Ltd. v. Maywald,92 homeowners sued contractors for 
problems related to their homes’ foundations more than two years after the 
complained-of work. The claims in Gonzales were deemed time barred.93 The 
claims in Maywald were not.94 
In Gonzales, the home had water leaks under its foundation. Gonzales hired 
Olshan to repair the resulting damage to the foundation. Olshan’s written 
agreement stated that it would make repairs in a good and workmanlike 
manner.95 In 2002 and 2003, Olshan excavated tunnels under the home to 
allow plumbers to fix additional leaks. Olshan leveled the foundation in August 
2003 and again in October 2003. During the second leveling, an Olshan 
employee told Gonzales that Olshan’s work was “the worst job I have ever 
seen.”96 The employee also cautioned that the tunnels should not be re-filled 
until the foundation was properly repaired and even advised Gonzales to hire an 
attorney.97 
In November 2003, Olshan sent an engineer to the home who told Gonzales 
that the foundation was functioning properly. Still, Gonzales refused to allow 
the tunnels to be re-filled because she believed she was on Olshan’s wait list for 
further work related to the troubled foundation. In July 2005, Olshan sent 
another engineer to the home. The engineer inspected the home and reported 
that the foundation was working properly. Olshan wanted to finish the job and 
fill in the tunnels, but Gonzales again refused. 
In May 2006, more damage to the home was noted. Gonzales sued Olshan 
under several theories including breach of express and implied warranties and 
DTPA violations. The jury found that Olshan breached “the implied warranty of 
good and workmanlike repairs (but not its express warranty) and engaged in 
unconscionable actions under the DTPA.”98 Olshan appealed, and the San 
Antonio Court of Appeals reversed.99 
On further appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held that Gonzales’ DTPA 
claims were time barred because they accrued, at the latest, in October 2003 
when Olshan’s employee informed Gonzales of Olshan’s poor work.100 The 
common law doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply to the DTPA 
claims because the limitations period for a DTPA claim expressly includes a 
limited, 180-day fraudulent concealment provision.101 
In Maywald, after foundation issues surfaced in 2001, the Maywalds notified 
their contractor of those issues and sought repairs in 2003; suit was filed in 
2008. In contrast to the homeowner in Gonzales, the Maywalds believed their 
 
 92. Design Tech Homes, Ltd. v. Maywald, 2013 WL 2732068 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, 
pet. denied). 
 93. Gonzales, 400 S.W.3d at 59. 
 94. Maywald, 2013 WL 2732068 at *5. 
 95. Gonzales, 400 S.W.3d at 54. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 55. 
 99. Id. at 54–55. 
 100. Id. at 57–58. The court also held that Olshan’s express warranty (which was not breached) 
superseded any implied warranty. 
 101. Id. at 58–59. 
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contractor’s representations, including representations made in 2008, that there 
were no remaining foundation problems and that cracks in the walls and 
ceilings of the Maywalds’ home were due to normal settlement of the home’s 
foundation.102 
A jury sided with the Maywalds and found that the contractor violated the 
DTPA by making actionable misrepresentations. The contractors moved for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing “that the Maywalds failed to 
plead the discovery rule” and that the claims were therefore time barred. 
The trial court denied the motion for judgment and the court of appeals 
affirmed, concluding that the discovery rule was tried by consent.103 The court 
recognized the jury’s findings that the Maywalds “knew of, or, in exercise of 
reasonable diligence, should have discovered the injury to their property by 
January 2008,” and “should have discovered all the false, misleading, or 
deceptive acts or practices of [the contractor] by May 2009,” and that the lawsuit 
was filed within two years of that date.104 
D.  REMEDIES 
In Cruz v. Andrews Restoration, Inc.,105 the Texas Supreme Court examined the 
DTPA’s remedy of restoration.106 Heavy storms caused extensive damage to 
Cruz’s home. Litigation followed between Cruz, his insurer, and Protech, the 
company hired to repair the home. The insurer promised Protech that it would 
pay for its services, but ultimately paid only a portion, leaving outstanding 
invoices of $705,548.02.107 
Protech sued Cruz and the insurer. Cruz counterclaimed on several bases, 
including violations of the DTPA. “Cruz moved for partial summary judgment 
on one of his DTPA claims” alleging “that Protech’s work authorizations 
omitted language mandated by the Texas Property Code.”108 The trial court 
granted Cruz’s motion in part, holding that “Cruz was a [DTPA] consumer and 
that Protech committed a false, misleading, and/or deceptive act under the 
DTPA, but the court declined to grant summary judgment as to any remedy 
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sought by Cruz.”109 “In a subsequent order, the trial court found that 
$1,059,940.52 would be necessary to restore to Cruz all sums that had been paid 
to Protech by Cruz or on his behalf under the agreements,” but did not order 
restoration.110 
At trial, the court “instructed the jury that the trial court had previously 
found Protech’s failure to include the requisite Property Code language to be a 
false, misleading, or deceptive act that was a producing cause of injury or harm 
to Cruz.”111 The jury was then asked what sum of money would reasonably 
compensate Cruz for his resulting DTPA damages, to which the jury answered 
“$0.”112 Therefore, the “trial court ordered that Cruz recover no relief on” his 
DTPA claim.113 
On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that despite the trial court’s 
finding that Protech engaged in a deceptive act, Cruz was not entitled to 
restoration of consideration because Cruz had failed to prove that he was 
entitled to rescission.114 On further appeal, the Texas Supreme Court held that 
Cruz’s DTPA claim for restoration failed because he was not a prevailing party 
given that he had not sustained a finding of actual damages and because he 
failed to secure a finding that he relied to his detriment on any deceptive act.115 
The Texas Supreme Court further held that the DTPA’s restoration remedy 
contemplates mutual restitution and affirmatively adopted the prerequisites of 
section 54(5) of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
for relief under section 17.50(b)(3).116 
E.  JURISDICTION 
In Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P.,117 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit examined whether a bankruptcy court has constitutional 
authority to enter a final judgment on a DTPA counterclaim. After filing a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, and having obtained the bankruptcy court’s 
permission to hire a law firm to prosecute the lawsuit, Frazin sued Lamajak, Inc. 
in state court.118 Although Frazin received a discharge, the bankruptcy 
proceeding remained open; therefore any recovery from the Lamajak lawsuit 
would be applied to claims by Frazin’s unsecured creditors.119 
Frazin won a $6.3 million dollar verdict against Lamajak.120 When Lamajak 
appealed, the bankruptcy court gave Frazin permission to hire a different firm to 
handle the appeal.121 
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Frazin settled with Lamajak for $3.2 million.122 When Frazin’s lawyers filed 
their fee applications with the bankruptcy court, Frazin filed state law 
counterclaims against the law firms for, inter alia, violations of the DTPA.123 The 
dispute was tried and the bankruptcy court entered a final judgment that denied 
the DTPA claims and awarded the law firms their outstanding fees.124 
On appeal, Frazin argued that the bankruptcy court lacked authority under 
Stern v. Marshal125 to enter final judgment on his counterclaims. Agreeing with 
Frazin, the Fifth Circuit stressed the importance of Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution “in maintaining separation of powers . . . safeguarding the 
independence of the judicial branch, and protecting litigants.”126 The court held 
that bankruptcy courts “lack the constitutional authority to enter a final 
judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of 
ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”127 “Because it was not necessary to decide 
[Frazin’s] DTPA claim to rule on the [a]ttorneys’ fee applications, the bankruptcy 
court did not have authority to enter a final judgment as to that claim.”128 The 
court rejected the contentions that Frazin consented to the bankruptcy court’s 
jurisdiction and that Frazin waived any objection by filing his counterclaims 
with the bankruptcy court.129 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
If there is a common theme in the cases that populate this year’s survey, it is 
found in the testing of the boundaries of consumer protection laws—antitrust 
and DTPA cases alike. On the antitrust side, Actavis and Phoebe Putney Health 
System tested the limits of patent immunity and state action immunity, 
respectively, while AT&T Mobility examined the interplay of antitrust law and 
the Federal Arbitration Act. 
On the DTPA side, Retherford examined the professional services exemption 
to the DTPA, while Gonzales and Maywald applied the DTPA statute of 
limitations to similar, but not identical, facts. And two cases—Red Roof Inns and 
Asgari—examined the sufficiency of evidence offered in support of 
misrepresentation and nondisclosure claims. 
Perhaps the biggest surprise among this year’s cases was the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Actavis. For the past several years, the lower federal courts have been 
presented with numerous challenges to “reverse payment” schemes, usually 
concluding that absent proof that (1) the patent-in-suit was procured by fraud, 
(2) the infringement suit was objectively baseless, or (3) the exclusionary effects 
of the settlement exceeded the scope of the so-called “patent monopoly,” a 
reverse payment settlement does not violate antitrust law, as it is no more 
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exclusionary than the patent grant itself.130 
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility to uphold class 
action waivers likely surprised few practitioners. Since the mid-1980s, the Court 
has issued a procession of decisions enforcing agreements to arbitrate against a 
wide range of challenges.131 Although perhaps less surprising than Actavis, the 
Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility may well prove to be more far-reaching, and 
not in a way that necessarily advances the interests of consumers. Injuries to 
consumers—whether they be antitrust overcharges or deceptive sales practices—
often involve individual damages that are too small to make lawsuit or an 
arbitration proceeding worthwhile. Yet, especially when such claims involve a 
nationwide course of conduct, the aggregate harm to consumers may be in the 
millions or even billions of dollars. In such cases, class actions allow injured 
consumers to collectively pursue their claims in a single proceeding. By allowing 
sellers to foreclose consumers access to such remedies by including arbitration 
and class action waiver language in their form contracts the Supreme Court has 
erected a powerful obstacle to the vindication of consumer’s rights. 
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